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Abstract. There is extensive field and experimental evidence in
a wide variety of environments showing that behavior depends on a
reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization
for such behavior. Our approach is dual, we study choice behav-
ior and preference relations. We proceed by gradually imposing
more structure on behavior, requiring higher levels of rationality,
that free the decision-maker from certain types of manipulations.
Depending on the phenomena one wants to model, one degree of
behavioral structure will be appropriate or another. We provide
two applications of the theory: one to model the status-quo bias,
and another to model addictive behavior.
Keywords: Individual rationality, reference-dependence, ratio-
nalization, path-independence, menu-independence, status-quo bias,
addiction, habit formation.
1. Introduction
The last decades have accumulated extensive evidence to suggest
that preferences in a variety of settings are influenced by a reference
point. The reference point may be interpreted as the default choice as
in status quo bias or endowment effect literature; the aspiration level
as in aspiration adaptation models; the convention, norm, or belief
about what one should choose, as, for example, in cognitive dissonance
studies; the past consumption as in addiction, habit formation, status-
seeking, or brand loyalty models; etc. What these cases have in com-
mon is that there is overwhelming evidence to document them, and
that deviations from the standard rational choice theory are made in
a predictable way.
In this paper we provide an axiomatically-based theory for the study
of reference-dependent behavior. We focus on those cases where, if
it exists, the reference point is in itself an element of the choice set.
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2Furthermore, the reference point changes with each choice, in the sense
that the last choice is the new reference point. Later, in section 5.3 we
will allow the reference point to be a function of the complete choice
history. Many of the above examples belong to this type of cases,
although they by no means cover them all.1
Our axiomatic approach is dual. We study reference-dependent be-
havior by exploring properties on reference-dependent choice correspon-
dences, and reference-dependent preferences. In the former case, a
choice problem is defined as a pair (T, s) where T is a subset of X, the
universal set of alternatives and, following Masatlioglu and Ok (2003),
either s ∈ T , in which case we say that the choice problem has a ref-
erence point s, or s /∈ X, in which case we say that (T, s) represents
a choice problem without a reference point, paralleling the standard
case. In the preference approach we assume a collection, or in the
terminology of Tversky and Kahneman (1991), a book of preference re-
lations, one for each of the elements in the universal set of alternatives
X, and one binary relation that represents the preferences when there
is no reference point, again paralleling the standard case. That is, we
consider situations with and without a reference point. As a quick il-
lustration consider the situation where agent A is about to buy a car.
Her preferences over the set of feasible cars may depend on whether
she currently owns, say, a classic SAAB-900, or no car at all. In the
former case it may well be that A is biased to keep her classic car, and
only if there is an exceptionally good car that beats the classic in all
dimensions, will A may be willing to buy it. On the other hand, if A
does not own the classic car, but it belongs to the set of feasible cars,
A may well prefer a standard new car.
We proceed by gradually imposing more structure on reference-de-
pendent behavior, requiring higher levels of rationality that free the
decision-maker from certain types of manipulations. We start the anal-
ysis by studying the properties that are needed to rationalize reference-
dependent choice correspondences. That is, we explore the conditions
that a book of preference relations needs to satisfy in order to give
the same choice behavior as the choice correspondence. We argue that
this consistency requirement is a minimal rationality condition to be
imposed on a theory of reference-dependent behavior. By extending
properties α, β, and the weak axiom of revealed preferences to choice
problems with reference points, we obtain that a choice correspondence
1See Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) for an example of a reference-dependent model
where the reference point does not necessarily belong to the choice set. We will
discuss this further in the conclusions.
3satisfies properties α and β, if and only if, it satisfies the weak axiom,
if and only if, there exists a book of complete preorder relations that
rationalizes the choice correspondence. These results are in line with
those in the classical theory. However, we will show that we deviate
in some important points from the classical results. For example, we
do not find uniqueness in the existence of the book of binary relations
that rationalizes the choice correspondence.
From this minimal rationality requirement, we proceed to identify
conditions that guarantee that a reference-dependent decision maker is
invulnerable to certain types of manipulation. We first study undomi-
nated behavior. By undominated behavior we refer to situations where
there are no cycles involving at least a strict link. For example, let an
agent be confronted with a choice problem involving two alternatives,
x and y, and let us assume that when she chooses from reference point
x she strictly prefers y and vice versa. The agent will be switching from
x to y, from y to x, and so on. Clearly, such erratic behavior is not
consistent even with minimal rationality requirements. We identify the
axioms on preferences and on choice correspondences that, in addition
to those mentioned above, guarantee undominated behavior.
Furthermore, we say that behavior is path-independent if, given a
choice set, final choices (to be formally defined below) cannot be influ-
enced by the initial choice of reference point. Our next result, building
on those already mentioned, characterizes what sort of choice corre-
spondences and books of preferences satisfy path-independence.
Finally, a natural step further in the study of the rationality of
reference-dependent behavior is the analysis of when behavior is not
only independent of the initial reference point in a given choice set, but
also independent of the way in which the choice problem is presented.
That is, we will say that behavior is menu-independent whenever final
choices do not depend on the sequence in which choice problems are
presented.
After imposing all this structure the immediate question that arises
is whether behavior is still reference-dependent, or collapses instead
into a unique order, as in the classical setup. We will show by means
of an example that in fact there is in fact still room for reference point
dependence.
We end the paper by applying the theory derived here to two well-
established phenomena; status quo bias and addiction. We show that,
although their characterizations differ, choice behavior subject to the
status quo bias and to addiction can be rationalized by a book of com-
plete preorders, that satisfies undominated behavior, without being
necessarily path-independent or menu-independent.
4We close this introduction by connecting our paper to the theoret-
ical literature. To the best of our knowledge Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) provide the first explicit model of reference-dependent behavior.
The model is an extension of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect
theory to risk-less choices with the aim of modelling the status quo bias
and related issues. They work with a book of reference-dependent pref-
erence relations on a two-dimensional commodity space, and assume,
instead of axiomatically deriving, certain types of behavior (such as loss
aversion) that lead to the status quo bias.
Munro and Sugden (2003) revise and extend Tversky and Kahne-
man’s (1991) model to the n-dimensional commodity space. Their
primary aim is to simplify Tversky and Kahneman’s model in order
to provide a formulation closer to the classical setup. Sagi (2002) and
Sugden (2003) constitute further extensions of the original model. In
the former, an axiomatic characterization of Tversky and Kahneman’s
model in risky choices is provided. Sugden, on the other hand, pro-
poses a generalization of Savage’s expected utility theory to the case
where preferences are reference-dependent.
A second strand of the literature follows the revealed preference ap-
proach pioneered by Zhou (1997). He provides an axiomatic foundation
of the status quo bias for choice functions. His approach has been fol-
lowed by Bossert and Sprumont (2001), and by Masatlioglu and Ok
(2003). Bossert and Sprumont consider status quo choice correspon-
dences that select all those alternatives that are at least as good as the
status quo. Masatlioglu and Ok provide a powerful characterization
result of the status quo bias (see Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.2 be-
low), with the innovation of also considering choice problems without
a status quo. We adopt this innovation in our general framework of
reference-dependent behavior.
Our paper is novel in studying reference-dependent behavior from a
dual perspective, and in providing a general axiomatic baseline that
starts by imposing minimal rationality assumptions, and then gradu-
ally incorporate more structure into reference-dependent behavior for
riskless settings. It is our hope that the theory we present here will
prove useful for the analysis of reference-dependent phenomena other
than the status quo bias or endowment effect. As an illustration, we
apply the theory to model addictive and habit formation behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation
that will be used subsequently. In section 3 we study the rationaliza-
tion of reference-dependent choice correspondences and related issues.
Section 4 contains the analysis of the different types of manipulations
5to which reference-dependent decision makers may be subject. In sec-
tion 5 we develop two applications. Section 6 presents the conclusions
and all the proofs are given in section 7.
2. Notation
Let X be a nonempty set of elements, representing the alternative
space, and X the set of all nonempty subsets of X. For notational
convenience, and following Masatlioglu and Ok (2003), we use  to
denote an element such that  /∈ X. It will be convenient to define
X∗ = X ∪ {}. A choice problem is a pair (T, s), where T ∈ X , and
either s ∈ T or s = . When s ∈ T we say that (T, s) is a choice
problem that depends on a reference point, and when s =  we say
that (T, s) is a choice problem that does not depend on a reference
point. C(X) represents the set of all possible choice problems (T, s),
while Crd(X) denotes the set of all possible choice problems with a
reference point.
A choice correspondence c(T, s) assigns for every (T, s) a subset of
T in X . Hence, c : C(X)→ X , where c(T, s) ⊆ T for all (T, s) ∈ C(X).
Note that, as usual, c is by definition a non-empty valued mapping.
We now introduce reference-dependent preference relations. For ev-
ery s ∈ X∗ denote by s a binary relation on X, s⊆ X ×X. To the
collection of all such binary relations we denote {s}s∈X∗ . We refer
to this collection as the book of reference-dependent binary relations
associated to X∗.
Binary relations s and ∼s are the asymmetric and symmetric parts
of s, respectively. Hence, x s y if and only if x s y and ¬(y s x),
and x ∼s y if and only if x s y and y s x. We will say that a binary
relation is a preorder if it is reflexive and transitive, and a partial
order if it is an antisymmetric preorder. For any (T, s), M(T,s)
denotes the set of maximal elements in T with respect to s, that is,
M(T,s) = {x ∈ T : y s x for no y ∈ T}.
3. Rationalization of reference-dependent choice
correspondences
By rationalization of a choice correspondence c on C(X) we mean
that there is a book of binary relations {s}s∈X∗ such that, for any
choice problem (T, s) ∈ C(X), c(T, s) = M(T,s). That is, the
question of the rationalization of reference-dependent choice correspon-
dences addresses the fundamental problem of the existence of a book of
binary relations that is consistent with choice behavior.
6In a classic article, Arrow (1959) shows that in the context of choice
problems without a reference point, Samuelson’s weak axiom of re-
vealed preference (WARP) guarantees that there is a unique complete
preorder relation  that rationalizes c(·, ). Based on the version of
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), we now present a variant of
the weak axiom within the context of choice problems with a reference
point.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP): For any (T, s) ∈
C(X) with x, y ∈ T and x ∈ c(T, s), then for any (V, s) ∈ C(X) with
x, y ∈ V and y ∈ c(V, s), it must be that x ∈ c(V, s).
It is well-known that, in the standard context, the weak axiom is
equivalent to Sen’s (1969) properties α and β. Consider the following
adaptation of properties α and β, due to Masatlioglu and Ok (2003).
Property α: For any (T, s), (V, s) ∈ C(X), if y ∈ V ⊆ T and
y ∈ c(T, s), then y ∈ c(V, s).
Property β: For any (T, s) ∈ C(X), if z, y ∈ c(T, s), T ⊆ V , and
z ∈ c(V, s), then y ∈ c(V, s).
We show that the versions of properties α and β for reference-
dependent contexts are equivalent to the version of WARP introduced
above. It turns out that properties α and β (and consequently WARP)
imply the existence of a book of complete preorders that rationalizes
c. Furthermore, we show that the existence of such a book of complete
preorder relations implies that the choice correspondence c satisfies
those variants of properties α and β.
We argue, therefore, that properties α and β constitute minimal
rationality assumptions for a theory of reference-dependent behavior.
These properties impose a minimal degree of consistency on choice be-
havior while, at the same time, allowing a great deal of freedom to the
influence of the reference point on preferences. Consider the following
example.
Example 3.1. Let X = {x, y}, {x} = c(X, y) and {y} = c(X, x).
While c clearly satisfies properties α and β, the orderings from x
and y are opposite. In subsequent sections we will draw from this basic
rationality assumptions to impose more structure on choice behavior.
7In particular, the choice behavior implied in the above example will be
forbidden on the grounds of manipulation-free arguments.
We can now establish our first result.
Theorem 3.2. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following
three statements are equivalent:
• c satisfies axiom WARP.
• c satisfies properties α and β.
• There exists a book {s}s∈X∗ of complete preorder relations that
rationalizes c.
It is interesting to note that from the proof of Theorem 3.2 it be-
comes clear that only weaker versions of transitivity and completeness
are needed. We call these versions weak transitivity and weak com-
pleteness:
Weak Transitivity (WT): (i) For any x, y, z, s ∈ X such that
¬(s s x) and ¬(s s z), if x s y s z, then x s z. (ii) For any
x, y, z ∈ X, and s = , if x  y  z, then x  z.
Weak Completeness (WC): (i) For any x, z, s ∈ X such that
¬(s s x) and ¬(s s z), either x s z, or z s x, or both. (ii) For
any x, z ∈ X, and s = , either x  z, or z  x, or both.
WT and WC require that, when there is no reference point, the
standard conditions are imposed. However, when there is a reference
point s ∈ X, WT and WC only impose restrictions when alternatives
x and z are no worse than the reference point s. That is, in a way,
WT and WC only apply to cases that are “above” the reference point.
Transitivity and completeness of the book of binary relations could
likewise be relaxed in all the results that follow.
It becomes clear from the proof and our previous comment that,
contrary to the classic result of Arrow, the book of complete pre-
orders rationalizing c need not be unique. Take the binary relation
Rs defined in the proof of Theorem 3.2. That is, xRsy if and only if
x ∈ c({x, y, s}, s). Non-uniqueness arises as a result of the fact that,
when alternatives x, y, s ∈ X are all distinct, then it may well be that
{s} = c({x, y, s}, s), and therefore ¬(xRsy) and ¬(yRsx). Hence, Rs
may be non-complete, and therefore its completion admits different
versions.
8A final note on Theorem 3.2 is that it is easy to show that all axioms
are independent. This is true for all the results contained in this paper.
Since the proofs are very simple we omit them here, but we can provide
them upon request.
We close this section by addressing an important related question
that has to do with the relation between binary relations and choice
behavior: when does a book of binary relations generate choice behav-
ior that satisfies properties α and β? In line with classical results, the
following proposition states that the only requirement is that the book
be comprised of complete preorder relations. Since the proof of this
result is straightforward we omit it.
Proposition 3.3. If {s}s∈X∗ is a book of complete preorder relations,
then M satisfies properties α and β.
The following example shows that the converse is not generally true.
Let X = {x, y, z, s}, and s s x, s s y, and s s z. Then, M(·,s)
satisfies properties α and β, but it may well be that x s y s z and
z s x. This example reinforces the idea that when there is a reference
point s ∈ X, the orderings “below” the reference point s are inessential,
which could cause intransitivities.
4. On Manipulating a reference-dependent
Decision-Maker
A decision maker whose behavior is reference-dependent may be sub-
ject to different types of manipulations. In this section we study three
such types: dominated behavior, dependence on the starting point, and
dependence on the sequence of presentation of choice problems. We will
study the properties that guarantee behavior to be free of these kinds
of manipulation. These properties gradually impose more structure
on behavior by demanding higher levels of rationality. Contingent on
the phenomena to which the theory is applied, it will be convenient to
impose one type of behavior or another.
Typically, one of the first rationality demands is the requirement
that behavior be undominated. Example 3.1 above shows a case of
dominated behavior. Such a decision maker is never satisfied and hence
may always be willing to change from x to y, from y to x, and so
on ad infinitum. Clearly, such erratic behavior is not consistent even
with minimal rationality requirements. In section 4.1 we identify the
conditions that guarantee that a decision maker is free of this sort of
cycle.
9These are not the only traps that a reference-dependent decision
maker may be involved in, however. The agent may exhibit undomi-
nated behavior, while being subject to the manipulation of an external
agent that may exert some influence on her “final” choice (to be pre-
cisely defined below). Consider the following example.
Example 4.1. Let X = {x, y}, {y} = c(X, y) and {x} = c(X, x).
This time the decision maker exhibits undominated behavior but,
when confronted with choice problem (X, x) selects x, and when pre-
sented with choice problem (X, y) she chooses y. That is, given the
choice set X her choice depends on whichever reference point prevails.
Anyone who is able to impose one reference point or the other has
the power to dictate the final choice of the decision maker. When a
subject is free of this sort of manipulation we say that her behavior is
“path-independent”. It is convenient to note, however, that this type
of manipulation is not necessarily negative. That is, given that the be-
havior of a subject is path-dependent, she can be manipulated in such
a way as to increase her well-being (see footnote 11). The properties
that guarantee path-independence are analyzed in section 4.2.
Finally, while it is conceivable that a subject with undominated be-
havior also satisfies path-independence, her final choices may still de-
pend on the particular sequence of presentation in the choice prob-
lems. In section 4.3 we will study this case under the rubric of “menu-
independence”.
The following definition will be helpful in the analysis that follows.
Definition 4.2. A sequence of reference-dependent choice problems
(T, si)
n
i=0 with si ∈ T is said to be an RD-chain if si ∈ c(T, si−1) for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. An RD-chain is cyclical if s0 ∈ c(T, sn). An RD-chain
is strict if there exists k in {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} such that sk 6∈ c(T, sk).
Clearly, any RD-chain with i ≥ 1 in Example 3.1 is a strict, cyclical
RD-chain, while any RD-chain in Example 4.1 is a cyclical but non
strict RD-chain. The next example shows the case of a strict RD-chain
that is non cyclical.
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Example 4.3. Consider the set X = {0, 1} × N where N is the set of
natural numbers, and the function f : X −→ X defined as follows:
f(x) = f((x1, x2)) = ({x1} × [x2
k
, kx2]) ∩X,
where k > 2. Take a choice correspondence such that for any (T, s) ∈
Crd(X), it is c(T, s) = z where z is the greatest vector in the set T∩f(s).
The behavior described in the above example corresponds to an agent
who, when endowed with a reference point s = (s1, s2) ∈ X: (i) follows
a “social norm” or a “convention” s1 ∈ {0, 1}, and (ii) maximizes
the consumption of a “good” in a neighborhood of its reference point
s2 ∈ N. Hence, it follows that any RD-chain with i ≥ 1 is non-cyclical
and strict.
Note that in Definition 5.6 it is stated that si ∈ T , hence one may
wonder about RD-chains with si = . Note, however, that since
c(T, ·) ⊆ T then si =  is only possible when i = 0, but then, for
our purposes, one can take the RD-chain following s0 = .
Finally, we would like to stress that, implicit in the analysis that
follows, it is assumed that the decision-maker is “myopic”, that is,
she does not anticipate how her choice behavior will react to current
choices. Although this may be a strong assumption for a fully ratio-
nal theory of decision, it seems a sensible assumption for a boundedly
rational theory.
4.1. Undominated Behavior. Undominated behavior is often im-
posed as a very first rationality requirement. For its motivation, con-
sider the following “money-pump” argument. Take, in the context of
the classical formulation: x  y  z  x. Suppose the agent starts
with option x. Since z  x, the agent could pay a small enough sum
to obtain z instead of x. After this trade, the agent could, by similar
reasoning, obtain y and eventually return to x. The agent comes back
to the original element, but with her money endowment diminished,
and would again for a small enough sum be willing to trade x for z.2
The latter is a clear example of the possible irrationality of intran-
sitive agents, who can be manipulated into sequences of trades. Of
course, this argument can apply not only to triples but to any sequence
of elements and also to cases in which only one of the links among the
2There are however many discussions on the general validity of the money-pump
argument (see for example Raiffa 1968, Fishburn 1988, or Mandler 2001). In par-
ticular, it could be argued that in order for the money-pump argument to be valid,
preferences should be defined over the Cartesian product of money and alternatives.
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options is strict. Undominated behavior in the context of reference de-
pendence can be directly stated in the form of the following property.
Crossed Transitivity (CT): For any collection s0, s1, . . . , sn ∈ X
such that sn sn−1 sn−1 sn−2 sn−2 . . . s1 s0 s0 with at least one strict
inequality, we must have sn sn s0.
Notice that in this context a sequence of trades implies that the agent
agrees to give up her current reference alternative. Crossed Transitivity
establishes that when an agent’s reference point is the last alternative
in the sequence, namely sn, she should strictly prefer the latter to the
initial alternative s0. Further, it is convenient to stress the generality
of property CT. It involves finite sequences of any length, where all but
one of the binary comparisons may be indifferent comparisons. Obvi-
ously, if all were indifferent binary comparisons, then no alternative is
dominated.
In the next result we show the choice structure of an agent endowed
with complete preorders that satisfy Crossed Transitivity. To do so we
only need to discuss a particular class of choice sequences.
Non-Strict Cycles (NSC): There is no RD-chain associated to the
choice correspondence c that is cyclical and strict at the same time.
Notice that the previous definition involves only choice problems with
the same set of available options.3 We show next that this is sufficient
to guarantee that the book of complete preorders {s}s∈X∗ that ratio-
nalizes c satisfies CT.
Theorem 4.4. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following
two statements are equivalent:
• c satisfies properties α, β and NSC.
• There exists a book {s}s∈X∗ of complete preorder relations that
rationalizes c, and that satisfies CT.
Theorem 4.4 constitutes the second step in the imposition of a ra-
tionality structure on reference-dependent behavior. We now go a step
further and study other sources of manipulation.
3Houthakker (1950) already proposed a property, “semitransitivity”, that re-
stricts the relation between the first and last elements of a chain. In his version,
however, the choice set may change from one link to the other.
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4.2. Path-Independence. We will say that behavior is path-indepen-
dent if, for any given T in X , “final” choices do not depend on an
initial reference point. That is, path-independence implies that, for
any given set of alternatives T , the fact that the RD-chain starts from
s ∈ T or from x ∈ T is inessential. Clearly, path-independence imposes
a great deal of consistency between the preference orders of different
reference points. This leads naturally to the following question: Is it
still the case that reference-dependent behavior that is rationalizable,
and undominated, and that satisfies path-independence may depend on
a reference point, or does it instead collapse into a unique order as in
the classical setup? We will see that behavior may in fact still depend
on reference points. This shows that behavior exhibiting a great deal
of rationality may still show reference point dependency.
The following definition states precisely what we mean by “final”
choices.
Definition 4.5. Set L is a limit set of problem (T, s0) ∈ C(X) if the
following two properties are satisfied:
• For any RD-chain (T, si)ni=0 containing a cyclical chain (T, si)ni=j,
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, it is {sj, sj+1, . . . , sn} ⊆ L.
• For any z ∈ L, there exists an RD-chain (T, si)ni=0 containing a
cyclical chain (T, si)
n
i=j and z ∈ {sj, sj+1, . . . , sn}.
A limit set of a choice problem (T, s0) is the collection of alternatives
in T within any RD-chain starting from (T, s0) continues cyclically.
Consider the following example.
Example 4.6. Let X = {x, y, z}, c(X, x) = c(X, y) = {x, y}, and
c(X, z) = {y}.
Starting from (X, z) the following RD-chains are possible:
(1) (X, z), (X, y), (X, y), . . . , (X, y), . . .
(2) (X, z), (X, y), (X, x), (X, y) . . . , (X, x), (X, y), . . .
(3) (X, z), (X, y), (X, x), (X, x), . . . , (X, x), . . .
That is, the decision-maker may continue cyclically to choose alterna-
tive y when the reference point is y, or repeatedly switch back and forth
between x and y, or stick with x. Clearly, no cyclical chain starting
from (X, z) goes through z. Therefore, the limit set of (X, z) is {x, y}.
Hence, the limit set L of a choice problem (T, s) can be regarded as
the set of possible final choices.
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In Example 4.3, for any y ∈ X there exists no limit set of (X, y).
This is because there exists no cyclical chain. The decision maker in
Example 4.3 sticks to her norm and locally maximizes the consumption
of a good, increasing its consumption level choice by choice. In Example
3.1 the limit sets of (X, x) and (X, y) are respectively {y} and {x}, and
in Example 4.1 the limit sets of (X, x) and (X, y) are {x} and {y}.
Note that NSC implies that any set of alternatives V that belongs to
a limit set L and that constitutes a cyclical chain must be non-strict,
or put differently, every mind-change about the preferred alternative
corresponds to an indifference comparison. This, however, it is not
equivalent to the fact that all alternatives in V are indifferent from any
reference point in V .
The next axiom formally states the path-independence condition on
choice correspondences.
Limit Set Uniqueness (LSU): For any T ∈ X and for any x, y ∈
T , if L is a limit of (T, x), then L is a limit of (T, y).
On the side of the reference-dependent preferences we introduce the
following condition, which constitutes a direct restriction on the differ-
ence between the orders of distinct reference points. For the moment,
we will refer to it as ISQP. The choice of this term will be clarified in
Section 5.1.
ISQP: For any x, y ∈ X, x x y implies x y y.
We can now present our next result.
Theorem 4.7. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following
two statements are equivalent:
• c satisfies properties α, β, NSC and LSU.
• There exists a book {s}s∈X∗ of complete preorder relations that
rationalizes c, and that satisfies CT and ISQP.
To illustrate Theorem 4.7 consider Example 4.3. It is easy to see that
it satisfies properties α, β and NSC, but it is not path-independent.
Take any finite choice set T containing both elements of norm 0 (say
x = (0, x2) where x2 ∈ N) and of norm 1 (say y = (1, y2), y2 ∈ N).
Clearly, the limit set of any (T, x) corresponds to the maximum of
all x ∈ T according to the natural order ≤ with x1 = 0, while the
limit set of any (T, y) is the maximum of all y ∈ T with y1 = 1.
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With regard to preferences, it is immediately clear that any book of
reference-dependent preferences that rationalizes this choice structure
does not satisfy ISQP. That is, from the point of view of norm 0, every
alternative following norm 1 is inferior, and viceversa.
Examples 3.1 and 4.1 are not path-independent either. Final choices
depend on initial reference points. Example 4.6 satisfies path-indepen-
dence if and only if we have that x z z. Provided x z z holds, then
for any binary relation 4 not only does it satisfy path-independence,
but it also describes rationalizable and undominated behavior, while at
the same time revealing differences in the orderings ofx andz.5 This
shows that while path-independence together with rationalizable and
undominated behavior imposes a great deal of structure on reference-
dependent behavior, there is still room for some degree of reference
point influence.
4.3. Menu-Independence. So far we have studied the independence
of final choices from initial reference points given a set T ∈ X , but
what happens when the choice set can also vary? We will tackle this
issue here, but first let us introduce a last bit of notation.
The limit set of choice problem (T, s) will be denoted by L(T, s).
Hence, if behavior is path-independent we can write: for any T ∈ X ,
and every s, y ∈ T , L(T, s) = L(T, y) = L(T ). We will say that
behavior is menu-independent if, given the set of possible choice prob-
lems C(X), final choices do not depend on starting from a particular
choice problem (T, s) ∈ C(X). Clearly, path-independence is a nec-
essary condition for menu-independence. That is, if there are choice
problems (T, s) and (T, y), with s 6= y, such that L(T, s) 6= L(T, y),
menu-independence is violated. Hence, we can formally state menu-
independence as follows.
Plott Independence (PI): For any T, V ∈ X , L(T∪V ) = L(L(T )∪
L(V )).
Clearly, our PI condition resembles the well-known Plott’s (1973)
independence condition.6 PI states that the limit set, that is the set
of possible final choices, depends neither on starting from a particular
4Actually, for any binary relation  consistent with properties α and β.
5And since we also leave  ‘almost’ free there are more sources of divergence
between orders.
6A note on the terminology used in this paper. The distinction between path- and
menu-independence is a useful distinction in the present framework with reference
points. This was of course unnecessary in the classical setup.
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reference point, nor from a particular decomposition of the choice set.
We will now see that LSU is not only a necessary condition for PI, it
also turns out that, in combination with NSC, it is a sufficient condi-
tion. To state the reverse implication we need to introduce a very weak
property:
Weak-NSC: When the opportunity set has two elements, there is
no RD-chain associated to the choice correspondence c that it is cycli-
cal and strict at the same time.
In so far as the Weak-NSC property only applies to binary choice
sets, it constitutes a considerable relaxation of NSC. We can now es-
tablish the following equivalence.
Theorem 4.8. For any choice correspondence c on C(X) that satisfies
properties α and β, the following two statements are equivalent:
• c satisfies properties NSC and LSU.
• c satisfies properties Weak-NSC and PI.
Consider Example 4.6, let x z z hold, and  be consistent with
properties α and β. Then, behavior is rationalizable, undominated, and
satisfies path-independence. Menu-independence implies that, e.g., if
we let our decision-maker first reach final choices from set {x, y}, then
from set {y, z}, and then from the final choices resulting from the
previous two problems, the conclusion will be the same as if we directly
present her with the choice set {x, y, z}. And this is in fact the case:
L(L({x, y}) ∪ L({y, z})) = L({x, y}) = {x, y} = L({x, y, z}).
Hence, path-independence is quite a strong condition to impose on
reference-dependent behavior. It not only requires that, in a given
choice set T , reference points do not influence final choices, but also
implies that the way in which the choice set is presented is inessential.
Note that since we are not imposing any extra property for menu-
independence, when x z z holds our conclusion for Example 4.6 re-
mains valid. That is, behavior that is rationalizable, undominated,
path-independent, and menu-independent does not necessarily collapse
into a unique ordering; reference points still matter. It is interesting
to note, however, that even in the case where the book of preference
relations collapses into a unique ordering, the cardinal representation
of preferences may differ between reference points. That is, preferences
may be ordinally but not cardinally equivalent.
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5. Applications
5.1. Status quo bias. There is a large and still growing experimental
and field literature supporting the view that a decision maker typically
values an alternative more highly when it is regarded as the status
quo, than otherwise. Versions of this are called status quo bias, or
endowment effect.7 An illuminating experiment that nicely illustrates
this bias is the following one, due to Knetsch (1989). A number of
participants was randomly divided into three groups; call them group
C, group M , and group N . Those in group C received from the ex-
perimenter a candy bar, those in group M received a mug, and those
in group N got nothing. Then, participants in groups C and M were
given the opportunity to change at zero cost their original object for
the other. They simply had to express their wish to change the object,
and the experimenter would immediately satisfy it. Participants in
group N were simply given the opportunity to choose between a candy
bar and a mug. The results are surprising. Preferences of subjects in
group N were more or less evenly divided, while the great majority in
groups C and M expressed no desire to change (90% of participants in
both C and M), showing a strong status quo bias.
The many different versions of the above experiment that have been
run have yielded similar results, which suggests a high level of robust-
ness in this finding. The implications of the status quo bias are far
more than anecdotal. This bias implies a significant discrepancy in
willingness to pay and willingness to accept, as exemplified in the ex-
periments of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) and Bateman,
Munro, Rhodes, Starmer, and Sugden (1997). It also implies a dif-
ference in the evaluation of opportunity costs, as opposed to costs of
any other nature (see Thaler, 1980). Furthermore, the status quo bias
implies that property rights influence the valuation of an object, and
hence question the so-called Coase Theorem (see Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler, 1990).8
7Thaler (1980) was the first to report this phenomenon. Other important ex-
perimental and field studies on the subject include Knetsch and Sinden (1984),
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Knetsch (1989), Tversky, Slovic, and Kahne-
man (1990), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990, 1991), and Bateman, Munro,
Rhodes, Starmer, and Sugden (1997). For reviews see Camerer (1995), and Rabin
(1998).
8One wonders whether “presumption of innocence”, which is common practice
in the legal systems of many countries, is an implicit recognition of the role of the
status quo bias in judgment. According to the status quo bias, the practice of
the “presumption of innocence” would reduce the risk of convicting an innocent
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In this section we apply the theoretical framework presented earlier
to model the status quo bias. In particular, we will show that a choice
correspondence that represents the status quo bias is rationalizable
by a book of complete preorders that is consistent with undominated
behavior, but not necessarily path-independent, or menu-independent.
In a recent paper, Masatlioglu and Ok (2003) nicely characterize a
choice correspondence representing the status quo bias. Here, we will
derive on the book of binary relations the set of axioms that are equiv-
alent to theirs. For the sake of completeness in the exposition, we
introduce Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2003) axioms below. For their moti-
vation, however, we refer to their paper.
Dominance (D): For any (T, s) ∈ C(X), if {y} = c(T, s) for some
T ⊆ V , and y ∈ c(V, ), then y ∈ c(V, s).
Status-quo Irrelevance (SQI): For any (T, s) ∈ Crd(X), if y ∈
c(T, s) and there does not exist any non-empty V ⊆ T with V 6= {s}
and s ∈ c(V, s), then y ∈ c(T, ).
Status-quo Bias (SQB): For any (T, s) ∈ C(X), if y ∈ c(T, s),
then {y} = c(T, y).
We now introduce the set of axioms needed to reproduce Masatlioglu
and Ok’s (2003) results on the book of binary relations. We start with
an independence axiom.
Upper Independence (UI): For any x, y ∈ X\{s}, such that
x s s and y s s, then x  y if and only if x s y.
This axiom restricts the influence of the reference point in evaluating
pairs of alternatives. If x is evaluated to be at least as good as y when
there is no reference point, then for a reference point s such that x and
y are strictly preferred to s, x cannot deteriorate relative to y. Note,
however, that the restrictions imposed by UI are limited. UI restricts
the ordering of pairs of alternatives x and y when the qualifier “x s s
and y s s” holds.
Consider now the following two axioms.
person, which is typically regarded as a worse scenario than acquitting someone
who is guilty.
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Status-quo Positivity (SQP): For any s ∈ X and y ∈ X\{s}, if
s  y then s s y.
Status-quo Positivity 2 (SQP2): For any distinct x, y, s ∈ X, if
x s s s y, then x x y.
These properties are easily justified by the empirical regularity that
we attempt to model here. Property SQP establishes that if in the
absence of a reference point, alternative s is valued to be as at least
as good as y, when s happens to be the reference point its valuation
with respect to y cannot only not deteriorate, it can only improve.
Property SQP2 extends the influence of the status quo bias to some
cases when there is a reference point. That is, if x is preferred to y
from the perspective of the reference point s, only when the reference
point s is in between of x and y, SQP2 states that the evaluation of
x cannot deteriorate with respect to y when x is itself the reference
point.
We now introduce the final axiom we need.
Status-quo Singularity (SQS): For any s, y ∈ X, if s ∼s y, then
s = y.
Property SQS strengthens the role of the status quo bias. It is a kind
of antisymmetry that applies only to comparisons with the reference
point. It imposes either that y is strictly preferred to the reference
point s, or vice versa. SQS guarantees that, whenever the reference
point is chosen, it is uniquely chosen.
We can now present the following result.
Theorem 5.1. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following
two statements are equivalent:
• c satisfies properties α and β, and axioms D, SQI, and SQB.
• There exists a book {s}s∈X∗ of complete preorder relations that
rationalizes c, and that satisfies UI, SQP, SQP2, and SQS.
Theorem 5.1, together with Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2003) Lemma 1
and Theorem 1, immediately imply the following corollary.9
9For any T ∈ X , M(T,) = {s ∈ T : y  s for no y ∈ T}, and for any s ∈ X,
U(s) = {y ∈ X : y  s}.
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Corollary 5.2. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the first
statement implies the second:
• There exists a book {s}s∈X∗ of complete preorder relations that
rationalizes c, and that satisfies UI, SQP, SQP2, and SQS.
• There exist ⊆∗, where  is a partial order and ∗ is a com-
pletion of , such that c(·, ) = M(·,∗), and for all (T, s) ∈
Crd(X)
c(T, s) =
{ {s} if s ∈M(T,)
M(T ∩ U(s),∗) otherwise
Furthermore, if X is a non-empty finite set then the above two state-
ments are equivalent.
For a detailed interpretation of the type of choice correspondence
obtained in Corollary 5.2 we refer to Masatlioglu and Ok (2003). Here
it is sufficient to note that when there is no reference point, the decision-
maker selects an element from the set of maximal elements based on
a complete preorder relation ∗. Clearly, this is no more than the
standard case. When there is a reference point s, the decision maker
will uniquely choose s if it belongs to the set of maximal elements of
a partial order , indicating a status quo bias. When the status quo
bias is not strong enough to evaluate s as one of the best elements,
then the decision maker will choose from the set of elements that are
strictly better than s according to the complete preorder ∗. Hence,
in the latter case the reference point becomes inessential.
Theorem 5.1 clearly shows that any “status quo bias-choice corre-
spondence” is rationalizable by a book of preorder relations. It is easy
to show that behavior subject to the status quo bias is undominated.
By way of contradiction and using NSC, let (T, si)
n
i=0 be a cyclical and
strict RD-chain. Since it is cyclical it must be that s0 ∈ c(T, sn), but
then SQB implies that {s0} = c(T, s0), which, since (T, si)ni=0 is strict,
constitutes a contradiction.
When in Section 4.2 we introduced axiom ISQP we promised further
explanation of the term. Consider SQP again, and note that it implies
that when x y y then ¬(y  x). By completeness it must be that
x  y, and by again applying SQP we obtain x x y. Hence, SQP to-
gether with completeness implies that if x y y, then x x y. Remark-
ably, ISQP involves precisely the reverse implication, namely if x x y,
then x y y. We, therefore, named this axiom Inverse Status Quo Pos-
itivity (ISQP). The implication of the latter on the relation between
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path-independence and status quo bias is clear; a choice correspon-
dence representing the status quo bias need not be path-independent.
The following example represents the case of a “strong” status quo
bias that does not satisfy path-independence. It can be argued that
the example is an abstract representation of Knetsch’s experiment. Let
X = {x, y}, where x x y, y y x, and x ∼ y. When there is no ref-
erence point, both alternatives are evaluated by the decision-maker as
indifferent, but as soon as the decision-maker has a reference point,
she unambiguously prefers the reference point to the other alterna-
tive. However, path-independence is clearly violated; the final choice
depends on which reference point is taken first.
Hence, a decision maker that manifests the status quo bias neverthe-
less exhibits choice behavior that can be rationalized through a book
of complete preorder relations, and is undominated. This suggests that
there is still a great deal of rationality in those who are subject to this
bias.10 However, such a decision maker could easily be manipulated
in situations where an external agent may exercise some influence on
the prevalence of a specific reference point, or on the way the choice
problem is presented. In this sense, the final choice depends on the
discretion of the agent.11
5.2. Addiction. Our second application concerns addictive behavior
and habit formation models. We chose this application for three rea-
sons: (i) It shows that the theory we are proposing has a considerable
range of application, (ii) it illustrates that the theory can be directly
applied to richer contexts than those considered so far, and (iii) it sug-
gests possible directions for future research.
Since Duesenberry (1949), Pollak (1970), and Ryder and Heal (1973)
the literature concerning models of habit formation and addiction has
attracted the attention of economists. The former is used in variants
of growth models to explore life-cycle consumption plans, and is being
applied to a wide variety of cases (see, e.g., Campbell 1999). With
regard to the latter, the work of Becker and Murphy (1988) has gen-
erated an enlightening discussion on how to approach the modelling
10Interestingly, Huck, Kirchsteiger, and Oechssler (2003) theoretically show that
decision makers that exhibit a status quo bias are favored by evolution.
11Camerer, Issaharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) argue that
the status quo bias constitutes a perfect example for the possibility of what they call
“paternalistic regulation”. That is, regulation that could result in great benefits to
those incurring in this error, while causing little harm to those that are not subject
to it.
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of addictive behavior (see, e.g., Herrnstein and Prelec 1992, and El-
ster 1999). The modelling approaches to both types of phenomena are
very similar. It is typically assumed that an increase in past consump-
tion increases present and future consumption, and hence the focus is
mainly on increasing consumption patterns.
To be more specific, we will interpret the behavior arising from the
axioms below on the grounds of addiction, and leave aside the habit
formation interpretation. We will say that behavior is addictive if (1)
the current reference point is the last level of consumption; (2) given
the actual reference point, the individual either maintains the current
level of consumption or increases it; (3) there is a saturation level over
which increments in consumption are not positively evaluated; (4) the
higher the reference point, the higher the saturation level; and (5) for
any reference point, every alternative between two selected alternatives
is also selected.
We now turn to the characterization we propose. We begin by in-
troducing a linearly ordered universal set of alternatives (X,≤). That
is, ≤ is a transitive, complete and antisymmetric binary relation over
the non-empty alternative space X, and < is the asymmetric part of
≤. To illustrate, consider that X = [0, k] represents the feasible set of
grams of some addictive substance, where a natural linear order arises.
We start with the characterization of choice correspondences.
Monotonicity (M): For any (T, s) ∈ C(X), if y ∈ c(T, s) then
s ≤ y.
This axiom simply states that addictive behavior leads to consump-
tion levels above the reference point, where ‘above’ is interpreted ac-
cording to ≤. In a recent paper Bossert and Sprumont (2001) for-
mulated a similar property, called Non-deteriorating Choice. Their
interpretation is that ≤ is a preference relation, and hence, the agent
behaves by choosing a better alternative than the reference point. Here,
however, since we are describing addictive patterns we maintain a more
general interpretation of ≤.
Saturation Monotonicity (SM): For any pair (T, s), (T, r) ∈ C(X),
if s ≤ r then, for all p ∈ c(T, r) there exists q ∈ c(T, s) such that q ≤ p.
SM imposes a weak property on the monotonicity of the sets of pos-
sible consumption levels selected. It states that if p is chosen from r,
then from the perspective of any reference point below r, say s, the set
of possible choices should start before p. In other words, the saturation
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level of s (a consumption level above which increments according to ≤
are not evaluated as strictly positive) is lower than that of r.
Convexity (C): For all (T, s) ∈ Crd(X), if V ⊆ T, v ∈ c(V, s), t ∈
c(T, s), if there is p ∈ V such that v ≤ p ≤ t or t ≤ p ≤ v then
p ∈ c(V, s).
Whenever T = S, C simply means that any alternative in between
two selected ones should also be selected. If T 6= S and t ∈ V , then
if properties α and β apply, it must also be that t ∈ c(V, s). However,
it could be the case that t 6∈ V . In such cases, C imposes that any
available level in between v and t should be selected when V is the
choice set.
We now introduce a set of axioms over a book of binary relations
that characterize addictive behavior.
Left Status-quo Positivity (LSQP): For any s ∈ X and y ∈
X\{s}, if y ≤ s then s s y.
Notice the analogy between LSQP and axiom SQP, used in the pre-
vious application. If the linear order ≤ describes the same ranking as
, both axioms are equivalent. This could be the case if, say, a “clean”
person who has not yet consumed any level of the addictive substance
(e.g. cigarettes) were to contemplate that “more cigarettes are better
than less”. However, it can perfectly be the case that preferences with-
out a reference point  are very different. In such cases, both axioms
diverge. LSQP establishes that the evaluation of the reference point
cannot deteriorate for those initiating in addictive behavior.
Status-quo Monotonicity (SQM): For any x ≤ y ≤ u ≤ v ele-
ments of X, such that v x u x x it must be that v y u.
Suppose that the greater element v is clearly preferred to u whenever
the reference point is x, and both are significant with respect to x. If
we move the reference point nearer to the pair u, v, this comparison
must necessarily remain the same.
Absence of Jumps (AJ): If y x x, x ≤ h ≤ y then h x x.
If an alternative is preferred to the reference point, intermediate lev-
els should also be preferred to the reference point.
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Weak single peakedness (WSP): If y x z x x, y ≤ z ≤ h
implies z x h.
WSP establishes that, once an agent has decided not to positively
evaluate improvements over ≤, this pattern is maintained. Notice
that standard single peaked preferences satisfy stronger versions of
this property. First of all, with single peaked preferences the above
restriction is imposed over the entire set X, while we only impose it for
elements above the reference point. Secondly, single peakedness would
require a strict preference whenever z < h, which is not our case.
Theorem 5.3. For any choice correspondence c on C(X), the following
two statements are equivalent:
• c satisfies properties α and β, and axioms M, SM and C.
• There exists a book {s}s∈X∗ of complete preorder relations that
rationalizes c, and that satisfies LSQP, SQM, AJ and WSP.
Addictive behavior is obviously a type of undominated behavior. By
M, any RD-chain (T, si)
n
i=0 must satisfy si ≤ si+1, i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1.
In order to be strict, it must be that sk < sk+1 for some k, and there-
fore, it cannot be cyclical. On the other hand, the following example
shows that it is neither necessarily path-independent, nor, therefore,
menu-independent.
Example 5.4. Let X = {x, y, z}, x ≤ y ≤ z, y x x x z, z y y y
x, and z z y z x.
If we let T = {x, z}, then it is clear that LSU does not hold. But the
above example says more. It describes a gradual pattern of addiction,
and shows that if the choice set could be manipulated, the addiction
level of the individual could be kept to a minimum. That is, if the
agent starts with reference point x (e.g., x = 0 grams of cocaine) and
the choice set is X, then he will end up consuming the maximum feasi-
ble quantity z, whereas if he is confronted with choice set T , from the
perspective of x he may find z too much and will then keep “clean”.
This is an illustration of why educational initiatives emphasizing “all
or nothing” consumption patterns may be successful in preventing ad-
diction (for a discussion see Herrnstein and Prelec 1992).
We end this section by addressing points (ii) and (iii) mentioned in
the motivation for this section. In the above mentioned models of habit
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formation and addiction it is typically assumed that the instantaneous
utility function at time t depends on the current level of consumption
ct and on the stock of consumption st = (1 − γ)st−1 + γct, γ ∈ (0, 1].
Then u(ct, st) is increasing in the difference ct − st. In our context,
we could interpret the stock of consumption as the reference point.
Therefore, this suggests that the current reference point need not be
the last choice as we have assumed so far, but a function of the history
of past consumption. In this line, consider the following formulation.
Let Ψ = X × (∪∞n=1Xn). An element (s0, c1, . . . , ck) ∈ Ψ reflects
an initial reference point s0 ∈ X and a sequence of consumption lev-
els c¯ = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ Xk ⊂ ∪∞n=1Xn. A reference point could then be
a function of the vector (s0, c1, . . . , ck). We impose two mild conditions:
Definition 5.5. We say that f : Ψ→ X is a reference point function
(single-valued) if for any s0 ∈ X and for any c¯ ∈ ∪∞n=1Xn:
• f(s0, c¯, f(s0, c¯)) = f(s0, c¯), and
• f(s0, c¯, c¯, . . . , c¯, c1, . . . , cp) = f(s0, c1, . . . , cp), where c¯ is equal
to (c1, . . . , cp, . . . , ck).
Note that throughout the paper f(s0, c¯) = ck where ck is the last
component of c¯. It is clear that in general, given T ⊂ X, f(s0, c¯) /∈ T .
However, under some particular restrictions the use of the reference
point function may be appropriate. As an illustration consider the
case where the family of choice sets is restricted to budget sets in a
linear space. Let T = [0, Y ] be such a budget set. In this case given a
s0 ∈ T and c¯ = (c1, . . . , ci) with ck ∈ T , for any 1 ≤ k ≤ i, it is clear
that:
si+1 = f(s0, c1, . . . , ci) = γci+(1−γ)f(s0, c1, . . . , ci−1) = γci+(1−γ)si−1
is also in T . Therefore, the reference point function of the habit for-
mation (and addiction) models is well defined.
When the reference point function is well defined we can establish
the following more general definitions of chains.
Definition 5.6. Given a reference point function f , < (T, si)
n
i=0, (ci)
n
i=1 >
is an ERD-chain (extended chain) if s0 ∈ T , si = f(s0, c1, . . . , ci) for
all i = 1, . . . , n, and ci ∈ c(T, si−1) for all i = 1, . . . , n. An ERD-
chain is cyclical if s0 = f(s0, c1, . . . , cn+1), where cn+1 ∈ c(T, sn). An
ERD is strict if there exists k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1} such that sk /∈ c(T, sk).
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Hence, the theory we propose in this paper can be extended to deal
with richer contexts. It remains a task for future research, though,
to characterize reference-dependent behavior when the reference point
may be a function of all the past history.
6. Conclusion
This paper is a reaction to the accumulated empirical evidence sug-
gesting that behavior is reference-dependent in a variety of environ-
ments. It has been our aim to provide an axiomatic characterization
of such behavior, general enough to be applicable to the modelling of
a wide range of specific phenomena. We believe that the incorporation
of these types of well-established and predictable phenomena into eco-
nomic theory is a natural step that will eventually help towards the
better understanding of economic behavior.
We have studied choice behavior and preference relations, and have
gradually imposed rationality demands on them. We have shown that
reference-dependent behavior may satisfy a great deal of rationality
demands, while still being dependent on reference points.
We have axiomatized reference-dependent behavior when the refer-
ence point, if there is one, belongs to the choice set. We chose this as
the best approach to certain problems, such as those we have modelled
here: status quo bias and addiction. Of course, in some situations it
may be more appropriate not to impose that the reference point be
in the choice set. Rubinstein and Zhou (1999) constitute an example
of the latter. They characterize choice functions that select the clos-
est point to the reference point in the choice set (they axiomatize a
“minimal distance” choice function). This suggests what we believe to
be a promising line for future research, namely, the characterization of
reference-dependent behavior for phenomena where the reference point
may not belong to the choice set.12
We further suggest that the application of the proposed theory may
prove fruitful for the modelling of other reference-dependent phenom-
ena, thus opening up another line for future research.
7. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let us first show that when c satisfies
axiom WARP, then c satisfies properties α and β. Consider a choice
correspondence satisfying WARP. Suppose, by way of contradiction
12Note however that, as Rubinstein and Zhou state, considering choice problems
where the reference point does not necessarily belong to the choice set does not
make the theory more general, since the required axioms will be more demanding.
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that α is not satisfied. In this case, there exist a pair of sets V ⊂ T
and a pair of elements x ∈ V , s ∈ V or s =  such that x ∈ c(T, s)
but x 6∈ c(V, s). Since c is non-empty valued by definition, there exists
y ∈ c(V, s), y ∈ V ⊂ T , thus contradicting WARP. Property β is
trivial, and therefore, this part of the proof is omitted.
We now show that if c(T, s) satisfies properties α and β, then there
exists a book of complete preorder relations {s}s∈X∗ such that c(T, s) =
M(T,s). Let c satisfy properties α and β, and define for all s in X∗
the binary relation Rs on X by xRsy if and only if x ∈ c({x, y, s}, s). In
order to condense the proofs, in the previous definition and throughout
the paper, we interpret that whenever s = , {x, y, } = {x, y}. Let
s≡ Rs ∪Ns, where Ns is the non-comparable part of binary relation
Rs. That is, xNsy if and only if ¬(xRsy) and ¬(yRsx). Since s is
trivially complete, we need only show that it is a transitive relation.
First note that whenever s = , we can apply standard results that
guarantee the transitivity of . Then, for all x, y, z, s ∈ X:
• Case 1: If xRsyRsz, then xRsz. Let xRsyRsz. If x ∈ c({x, y, z, s}, s)
by applying property α we directly obtain x ∈ c({x, z, s}, s). If s is
in c({x, y, z, s}, s), by property α, s ∈ c({x, y, s}, s), then by property
β, x ∈ c({x, y, z, s}, s), and by applying property α again we get x ∈
c({x, z, s}, s). If y is in c({x, y, z, s}, s), then a procedure analogous to
the previous one shows that x ∈ c({x, z, s}, s). If z ∈ c({x, y, z, s}, s),
applying property α implies that z ∈ c({y, z, s}, s), then by property β,
y ∈ c({x, y, z, s}, s), which was shown above to imply x ∈ c({x, z, s}, s).
• Case 2: If xNsyNsz, then xNsz. Let {s} = c({x, y, s}, s), {s} =
c({y, z, s}, s), and by way of contradiction, {s} 6= c({x, z, s}, s). If
x ∈ c({x, z, s}, s), by property α, x ∈ c({x, s}, s), and by property β,
x ∈ c({x, y, s}, s), which contradicts xNsy. If z ∈ c({x, z, s}, s), by
property α, z ∈ c({z, s}, s), by property β, z ∈ c({y, z, s}, s), which
contradicts yNsz. Hence it must be that {s} = c({x, z, s}, s).
• Case 3: If xRsyNsz, then xRsz. Let xRsyNsz. Then note that
y, z /∈ c({x, y, z, s}, s), because otherwise by property α, yNsz would
be contradicted. If {s} = c({x, y, z, s}, s), then by properties α and β,
{s} = c({x, y, s}, s), which can only hold when x = s. Then, if x = s,
since {x} = c({x, y, z}, x), property α implies that x ∈ c({x, z}, x).
Finally, if x 6= s, it must be that x ∈ c({x, y, z, s}, s), and by property
α, x ∈ c({x, z, s}, s), as desired.
• Case 4: We now show that xNsyRsz cannot hold. If x or y are in
c({x, y, z, s}, s), by property α, x ∈ c({x, y, s}, s) or y ∈ c({x, y, s}, s),
which contradicts xNsy. If z ∈ c({x, y, z, s}, s), by properties α and β,
y ∈ c({x, y, z, s}, s), which contradicts xNsy. Hence, {s} = c({x, y, z, s}, s),
but by properties α and β, {s} = c({y, z, s}, s), which contradicts yRsz.
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We now show that if y ∈ c(T, s) then y ∈ M(T,s). By property
α, y ∈ c(T, s) implies y s h for all h ∈ T , and hence it must be that
y ∈M(T,s). Now let y ∈M(T,s), which implies that y s h for all
h ∈ T . Take any z ∈ c(T, s). By property α, z ∈ c({s, y, z}, s). Since
y s z, it must also be that y ∈ c({s, y, z}, s), and hence property
β guarantees that y ∈ c(T, s). This concludes the second part of the
proof.
We finally show that if there is a book {s}s∈X∗ of complete pre-
orders that rationalizes c, then c satisfies WARP. Standard results ap-
ply to the case of s = . Now we study the case where s 6= . Let, by
reduction to the absurd, y ∈ c(T, s), s, x, y ∈ T ∩ V , x ∈ c(V, s) and
y /∈ c(V, s). Since y ∈ c(T, s) = M(T,s), there is no h ∈ T such that
h s y, but since y /∈ c(V, s) = M(V,s), then there is a k ∈ V such
that k s y. By transitivity and completeness, since x is maximal in
V , we must have x s y contradicting y ∈ c(T, s). 
The following lemma will be useful for our next characterization
result.
Lemma 7.1. Let c be defined on C(X) and satisfy properties α, β, and
NSC. Let {s}s∈X∗ be a book of complete preorders that rationalizes c.
Take sn sn−1 sn−1 sn−2 sn−2 . . . s1 s0 s0 with at least one strict
inequality. Then, for all p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, we
must have sp ∈ c({sp, sp−1, . . . , sp−t}, sp−1).
Proof of Lemma 7.1. If t = 1, then, for any p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, us-
ing sp sp−1 sp−1, we conclude sp ∈ c({sp, sp−1}, sp−1). We will prove
now the following induction hypothesis: If the result is valid for any
t = 1, 2, . . . , k with k < p (otherwise the induction is complete for
this value of p), it is also valid for t = k + 1. By contradiction, let
sp 6∈ c({sp, sp−1, . . . , sp−k−1}, sp−1). In this case, consider the set T =
{sp, sp−1, sp−2, . . . , sp−k−1}. If for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, we have sp−j ∈
c(T, sp−1) then by property α, we have sp−j ∈ c(T \ {sp−k−1}, sp−1)
and using the induction hypothesis and property β, we obtain sp ∈
c(T, sp−1), which is absurd. Then, we must have {sp−k−1} = c(T, sp−1),
and by properties α and β {sp−k−1} = c(T\{sp}, sp−1). By hypothesis it
must also be sp−1 ∈ c(T \{sp}, sp−2). Since sp−k sp−k−1 sp−k−1, we can
find an element sl1 such that sl1 ∈ c(T \{sp}, sp−k−1) and l1 > p−k−1.
If l1 6= p−1 proceed in an analogous way considering an element sl2 such
that sl2 ∈ c(T \{sp}, sl1) and l2 > l1 (note that such an l2 exists because
the induction hypothesis is valid for the set T \ {sp}, smaller than T ).
Since set T is finite, we will find an element lm = p− 1 such that slm ∈
c(T \{sp}, slm−1). The sequence of reference-dependent choice problems
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(T \{sp}, sp−1), (T \{sp}, sp−k−1), (T \{sp}, sl1), . . . , (T \{sp}, slm−1) con-
stitutes a strict RD-chain. However, sp−1 = slm ∈ c(T \ {sp}, slm−1),
contradicting NSC. Therefore, the induction is valid for t = k + 1.
Thus, the lemma is proved. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We first show that, given a choice correspon-
dence c satisfying properties α, β and NSC, we can find a book of pref-
erences satisfying the requirements. Consider the binary relations s
defined in the proof of Theorem 3.2. They turn out to be not only tran-
sitive but complete, and therefore, to conclude the proof we only need to
observe that they satisfy CT. Let sn sn−1 sn−1 sn−2 sn−2 . . . s1 s0 s0
with at least one strict inequality. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that s0 sn sn. Consider the set V = {s0, s1, . . . , sn}. Select a group
of elements by means of the following inductive argument:
(1) By hypothesis, there exists an integer k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} such
that sk ∈ c(V, sn). Select the smallest integer in such group and denote
it by p1.
(2) If pj = n, stop the inductive process. Otherwise, to obtain
pj+1, consider the problem (V, spj). Lemma 7.1 guarantees that spj+1
exists in c({s0, . . . , spj+1}, spj). Therefore, there exists an integer k ∈
{pj + 1, . . . , n} such that sk ∈ c(V, spj). Let pj+1 denote the smallest
integer with such property.
The inductive reasoning gives us a collection of natural numbers p1,
p2, . . . , pm wherem ≥ 2. The sequence of problems (V, sn), (V, sp1), . . . ,
(V, spm−1) constitutes an RD-chain. Moreover, we will now show that
this chain is strict. To see this, consider the strict comparison sr+1 sr
sr with r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. We need to study two cases:
• pq ≤ r < pq+1. We will show that pq 6∈ c(V, pq). To this end
we need to analyze two cases. First, if pq+1 − pq = 1 the preference
between these two elements is strict, and then pq 6∈ c(V, pq). Second,
if the difference is bigger, then suppose by way of contradiction that
pq ∈ c(V, pq). In this case, pq + 1 is also in c(V, pq), contradicting the
definition of pq+1.
• p1 > r. In this case, it is easy to see that sn 6∈ (V, sn). Otherwise,
0 = p1, which using s0 sn sn contradicts p1 > r.
We have proved that the RD-chain is strict. Therefore, by NSC, it
must be sn 6∈ c(V, spm−1), contradicting spm = sn ∈ c(V, spm−1). Hence
s0 sn sn cannot hold and, sn being complete, we obtain sn sn s0.
This proves that the book of preferences satisfies CT.
We now prove that if there is a book of reference-dependent pref-
erences satisfying the conditions, the corresponding choice mapping
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satisfies properties α, β and NSC. Taking into account Theorem 3.2,
we only need to prove NSC. Consider a strict chain (T, si)
n
i=0. Since the
chain is strict, there must exist 0 ≤ k < n and y ∈ T such that y sk sk.
Since si ∈ c(T, si−1), and given completeness, we must have si si−1 h
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, for all h ∈ T . In particular, we have sk+1 sk y and
by transitivity, we obtain sk+1 sk sk. We therefore obtain a sequence
of comparisons
sn sn−1 sn−1 sn−2 sn−2 . . . sk+1 sk sk . . . s1 s0 s0
and by applying CT we must have sn sn s0 which shows that s0 is
not in M(T,sn) = c(T, sn), as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 4.7. We begin by showing that if c satisfies
properties α, β, NSC and LSU, then there exists a book {s}s∈X∗ of
complete preorder relations that rationalizes c, and that satisfies CT
and ISQP. Take the book of complete preorders defined in the proof
of Theorem 3.2. By considering Theorem 4.4, we only need to check
ISQP. Consider by way of contradiction two elements x, y ∈ X such
that x x y but y y x. Since the book rationalizes c, we must have
{x} = c({x, y}, x) and y ∈ c({x, y}, y). Thus, the limit set of ({x, y}, x)
is {x}, while the limit of ({x, y}, y) must contain y, contradicting LSU.
We now prove the converse statement. Consider Theorem 4.4, then
we only need to check LSU. Suppose, by way of contradiction, the
existence of a subset T and elements x, y ∈ T such that
• L is the limit set of (T, x),
• L′ is the limit set of (T, y), and
with S 6= S ′.
Without loss of generality, suppose z ∈ L and z 6∈ L′, and take
w ∈ L′. By NSC, for all s ∈ L ∪ L′ we must have s ∈ c(T, s) (oth-
erwise, the cyclical subchain containing s would be strict, which is
absurd). Then, it is z ∈ c(T, z) and w ∈ c(T,w), implying z z w and
w w z. By ISQP we must have z ∼z w and w ∼w z. Thus, z ∈ c(T,w)
and w ∈ c(T, z). There exists a cyclical RD-chain (T, si)ki=0 such that
s0 = y and sk = w. Then, the chain (T, si)
k+1
i=0 , with sk+1 = z implies
that z ∈ L′, which is absurd. 
Proof of Theorem 4.8. That path-independence is a necessary con-
dition for PI is trivial. To see that NSC is also a necessary condition
consider by way of contradiction a cyclical and strict RD-chain where
the reference set T contains at least 3 elements. Since the chain is strict,
there exists a pair of elements x, y such that x 6∈ c(T, x), y ∈ c(T, x),
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and x, y ∈ L(T ). Properties α and β guarantee that {y} = c({x, y}, x)
and therefore, using Weak-NSC, it is clear that L({x, y}) = {y}. Con-
sider the non-empty sets A = {x, y} and B = T \ A. We chose
x ∈ L(T ), but note that neither x ∈ L(A), nor x ∈ L(B), and hence
x /∈ L(L(A) ∪ L(B)). Therefore, PI does not hold, a contradiction.
Finally Weak-NSC concludes the proof.
We now show that path-independence and NSC are sufficient to im-
ply PI and Weak-NSC. Since the second property is trivial, let us prove
Menu Independence. Let T and V be any two sets in C(X). First, let
z ∈ L(T ∪ V ) and, without loss of generality, let z ∈ T . Then, by NSC
it must be that z ∈ c(T ∪ V, z). Further, by property α we have that
z ∈ c(T, z), and hence by LSU, z ∈ L(T ). Hence, we can apply property
α again to get z ∈ c(L(T )∪L(V ), z), and by LSU, z ∈ L(L(T )∪L(V )).
Then we have that L(T ∪ V ) ⊆ L(L(T ) ∪ L(V )).
Now let z ∈ L(L(T ) ∪ L(V )). The case where z ∈ T and z ∈ V is
trivial. So consider, without loss of generality, that z ∈ T and z /∈ V .
By NSC, z z h for all h ∈ T ∪ L(V ). Let there exist a t ∈ V \L(V )
such that t z z. By LSU there are s0, s1, . . . , sn ∈ V and x ∈ L(V )
such that x sn sn sn−1 sn−1 sn−2 sn−2 . . . s1 s0 s0 t t z z. Then,
by Theorem 4.7 CT holds, which implies that x x z, and by ISQP we
have that x z z, a contradiction. Hence, z z h for all h ∈ T ∪ V ,
and then L(L(T ) ∪ L(V )) ⊆ L(T ∪ V ), as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We first show that if there is a book {s
}s∈X∗ of complete preorders that satisfies WT, UI, SQP, SQP2, SQS,
and c(T, s) = M(T,s), then c satisfies properties α and β, and axioms
D, SQI, and SQB. The implication on properties α and β is shown in
Theorem 3.2.
• D: Let y 6= s 6= . Let {y} = c(T, s) = M(T,s), and y ∈ c(V, ) =
M(V,), T ⊆ V . Then y s h for all h ∈ T \ {y}, and y  h for
all h ∈ V . For all t ∈ V \{s, y}, either t s s or s s t. When t s s,
given that y s s, then by UI, y  t implies y s t. If s s t, by
SQS s s t. Now, assume, by way of contradiction, that t s y. Then,
since y s s and s s t, M({s, y, t},s) = ∅, a contradiction. Then it
must be that y s t, and therefore, y ∈ M(V,s) = c(V, s). Now let
y = s 6= . Then y ∈ c(V, ) = M(V,) implies y  h for all h ∈ V .
By SQP y y h for all h ∈ V \{y}, and hence y ∈ M(V,y) = c(V, y).
Finally, the case when s =  is trivial, and therefore omitted.
• SQI: Let y ∈ c(T, s) = M(T,s), and assume that there exists
no non-empty V ⊆ T with V 6= {s} and s ∈ c(V, s). Then y s h
for all h ∈ T , and h s s for all h ∈ T\{s}. By applying UI we
get y  h for all h ∈ T\{s}. Finally, it must be that y  s, since
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otherwise s  y implies, by SQP, that s s y, a contradiction. Hence,
y ∈M(T,) = c(T, ).
• SQB: Let y 6= s 6=  and y ∈ c(T, s) = M(T,s). Then, y s h for
all h ∈ T . By SQS, y s s implies y s s. For all z ∈ T\{s, y}, either
s s z or z s s. If s s z, by SQS s s z. Then y s s s z, by
SQP2, implies y y z. If z s s, then y s z, by UI, implies y  z,
and SQP implies y y z. Since it must also be that y  s, by SQP,
y y s. Hence {y} = M(T,y) = c(T, y). Now let y 6= s = . Then if
y ∈ c(T, ) = M(T,), y  h for all h ∈ T , by SQP y y h for all
h ∈ T\{y}, and then {y} = M(T,y) = c(T, y). Finally, let y = s 6= .
If y ∈ c(T, y) = M(T,y), y y h for all h ∈ T , by SQS y y h for all
h ∈ T\{y}, and then {y} = M(T,y) = c(T, y).
To show the reverse implication we will use the book of binary re-
lations defined in the proof of Theorem 3.2, where it was shown that
if c satisfies properties α and β, then {s}s∈X∗ is a book of complete
preorders, and that c(T, s) = M(T,s).
• UI: Let x s s, y s s. We will show both implications for the case
of x 6= y; the case of x = y is trivial. Let x s y, then by definition,
either x ∈ c({x, y, s}, s) or {s} = c({x, y, s}, s). If {s} = c({x, y, s}, s),
then properties α and β imply that {s} = c({x, s}, s), which contradicts
x s s. Then, it must be that x ∈ c({x, y, s}, s). Note that s /∈
c({x, s}, s), and s /∈ c({y, s}, s). If s ∈ c({x, y, s}, s) then by property
α we get s ∈ c({x, s}, s), a contradiction. Hence we can apply SQI to
get x ∈ c({x, y, s}, ). By property α, x ∈ c({x, y}, ), as desired. Let
us now assume that x  y, and by way of contradiction, ¬(x s y).
Then x ∈ c({x, y}, ), and {y} = c({x, y, s}, s). By SQI we get y ∈
c({x, y, s}, ). By applying properties α and β, x ∈ c({x, y, s}, ). Now,
since {x} = c({x, s}, s) and x ∈ c({x, y, s}, ), by D, x ∈ c({x, y, s}, s),
a contradiction. Hence it must be that x s y.
• SQP: Let s  y, then it must be that s ∈ c({s, y}, ). Applying
SQB we get {s} = c({s, y}, s), as desired.
• SQP2: Let x s s s y, by transitivity, x s y, which by definition
implies that x ∈ c({x, y, s}, s). By SQB {x} = c({x, y, s}, x), and by
applying properties α and β, we get {x} = c({x, y}, x).
• SQS: Let s ∼s y. Since choice correspondences are non-empty
value by definition, the case of no comparability between s and y does
not apply here. Then s ∈ c({y, s}, s) and y ∈ c({y, s}, s). By SQB
{s} = c({y, s}, s), and hence y = s. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3. We first show that if c satisfies the men-
tioned properties, we can find a book of preferences as described. Con-
sider the book of complete preorders that rationalizes c in the proof
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of Theorem 3.2. If x > y, by M, we cannot have y ∈ c({x, y}, x) and
therefore, x x y, which proves LSQP.
To show SQM, consider x ≤ y ≤ u ≤ v with v x u x x. First of all,
we will prove that v x y. Otherwise, y x v x u x and therefore,
y ∈ c(T, x) where T = {x, y, u, v}. At the same time v ∈ c(V, x) with
V = {x, u, v}. Since y ≤ u ≤ v and u ∈ V by applying C we must
have u ∈ c(V, x) which is absurd because v x u. Thus, v x y. Given
the hypothesis, we must have {v} = c(T, x). Applying SM leads to
{v} = c(T, y) and therefore, v y u.
To show AJ, suppose y x x x h with x ≤ h ≤ y. Consider the
sets T = {x, y, h} and V = {x, h}. By hypothesis, y ∈ c(T, x) and
{x} = c(V, x). The application of C leads to h ∈ c(V, x). However, this
is absurd, since we cannot have h = x.
To prove WSP, suppose y x z x x and y ≤ z ≤ h. By way of
contradiction, let us suppose that h x z. There are two possibilities:
• If y x h, then consider T = {x, y, z, h} and V = {x, z, h}. It
is obvious that y ∈ c(T, x) while h ∈ c(V, x). By C it must be also
z ∈ c(V, x) which is absurd, because h x z.
• If h x y, consider the sets T = {x, y, z, h} and V = {x, y, z}.
Then we have h ∈ c(T, x) and y ∈ c(V, x). The application of C again
leads to z ∈ c(V, x) which is absurd because y x z.
This concludes the first part of the proof.
Now suppose that there exists a book satisfying the requirements.
To show M is straightforward. To prove SM, consider x ≤ y and
p ∈ c(T, y). By M we must have x ≤ y ≤ p. If p ∈ c(T, x), the proof is
complete. If not, consider any q ∈ c(T, x) such that p < q. In this case,
q x p and q x x. AJ guarantees that p x x. Then, applying SQM,
we have q y p and therefore, p 6∈ c(T, y) which is absurd. Therefore,
there are no such elements and any h ∈ c(T, x) must fulfil h < p, which
proves SM.
To end the proof, we only need to show that C is satisfied. Consider
V ⊆ T , v ∈ c(V, x) and t ∈ c(T, x). Let p ∈ V , with v ≤ p ≤ t and
suppose, by way of contradiction, that p 6∈ c(V, x). In this case, we
must have v x p and x ≤ v ≤ p ≤ t, otherwise by LSQP x x v,
a contradiction. Since t x x AJ implies that p x x. Therefore,
v x p x x and v ≤ p ≤ t guarantees p x t by application of WSP.
Therefore p ∈ c(T, x) and by property α, p ∈ c(V, x), which is absurd.
The case in which t ≤ p ≤ v is very similar and is, therefore, omitted. 
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